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COMMENT
DIGITAL LOVE: WHERE DOES THE
MARITAL COMMUNICATIONS
PRIVILEGE FIT IN THE WORLD OF
SOCIAL MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS
NICOLE SCOTT*
INTRODUCTION
Alongside social media, marriage has evolved significantly in the
last decade. What the institution of marriage once meant has changed.1
Communication between spouses through social media has become a
normal practice in the lives of many American couples. 2 74% of adults
that use the Internet have reported that the Internet, particularly social media, has positive impacts on their marriages. 3 Additionally, 21%
of these users have expressed that they feel closer to their spouses be-
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1. A Historical Look, MARRIAGE EQUALITY USA, (last visited Mar. 29, 2014)
http://www.marriageequality.org/a_historical_look.
2. Amanda Lenhart & Maeve Duggan, Couples, the Internet, and Social Media,
PEW
RESEARCH
INTERNET
PROJECT
(Feb.
11,
2014),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/02/11/couples-the-internet-and-social-media/.
3. Id.
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cause of the online communications they exchange. 4
On March 26, 1998, Brian Steven Crihfield was viciously murdered
by Roy Benny Helmick and Gypsy Buck Bohon (“Mr. Bohon”) in his
West Virginia trailer home.5 During the trial of Mr. Bohon, the State
intended to introduce a verbal conversation that took place between Mr.
Bohon and his wife regarding the murder.6 The Court ruled that the
admission of the conversation between Mr. Bohon and his wife was prohibited because it was a privileged communication and protected under
the marital privilege statute.7
Now imagine this situation with the current channels of communication. Instead of Mr. Bohon having a verbal conversation with his wife
about the murder, he and his wife were communicating via social media
private messages (e.g. Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, Instagram, etc.). Is
this communication still protected under the marital privilege?
It could be argued that the martial privilege should extend to communications between spouses made through social media. The martial
privilege has been around for centuries,8 and when the privilege was
created, the prevalent form of communication was verbal. Therefore,
the decision the Court reached in Bohon is conceivable. However, social
media has only been around since the late 70’s and courts have yet to
rule on whether the martial privilege applies to social media communication.9 Due to the recent spike in social media usage, it is foreseeable
that courts will one day apply the marital privilege to social media
communications, specifically communications via private messaging. 10
This comment explores the impact of recent developments in communication on the applicability of the marital communications privilege. Particularly, this article explores the role social media communication plays, focusing on whether a change is necessary for the privilege
to adhere to the recent changes in marriage and communication. Part II
of this article discusses the history of the marital privilege, the evolution of marriage, and the history of social media. Part III proposes the
need to extend the marital privilege to include private communications
on social media. I will advocate for this by comparing the Privilege to
other communication privileges, analyzing the Privilege’s current status
4. Id.
5. State v. Bohon, 565 S.E.2d 399, 401 (W. Va. 2002).
6. Id.
7. See id. at 405 (discussing conversations made in the presence of a third party).
8. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1980) (tracing the marital
privilege back to 1628).
9. See Brett Borders, A Brief History of Social Media, COPY BRIGHTER MARKETING
(June 2, 2009), http://copybrighter.com/history-of-social-media.
10. See generally Anthony Curtis, The Brief History of Social Media: Where people
interact freely, sharing and discussing information bout their lives (2013) (on file with
author).
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relating to electronic communications (including text messages and
emailing), and evaluating the current state of marriage in relation to
the Privilege.
II. BACKGROUND
THE HISTORY OF THE MARITAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE
The marital privilege is an exception to the general admissibility of
evidence and is justified based on its role in “fostering the harmony and
sanctity of the marriage relationship.”11 There are two types of marital
privilege: 1) the adverse spousal testimonial privilege and 2) the communications privilege.12 The adverse spousal testimonial privilege is one
with ancient roots, stemming back to 1628. 13 The adverse spousal testimonial privilege applies in criminal cases14 to any adverse testimony
that one spouse might provide as a witness against the other. 15
Deriving from what is known as spousal disqualification, the adverse testimonial privilege can be linked to two canons of medieval jurisprudence: the first canon states that the accused is not required to
testify on his own behalf because of his own interest in the proceedings;
the second canon states that the husband and wife are one, but since
women were not recognized legally, the husband accounted for that
one.16 Spousal disqualification remained intact until 1933, at which
time the Court, in Funk v. United States, abolished it.17 Although
spousal disqualification was abolished, Funk created a privilege rather
than a complete disqualification by allowing either spouse to prevent
the other from giving adverse testimony.18
The marital communications privilege applies to any “information
privately disclosed between husband and wife in the confidence of the
marital relationship.”19 Applicable to both criminal and civil cases, 20 the
marital communications privilege applies only to communications made
during the marriage and does not extend to communications made dur-

11. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44.
12. United States v. Brock, 724 F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 2013); see Trammel at 40
(discussing the history of the Privilege and how it became a two part privilege).
13. Trammel at 43.
14. Brock, 724 F.3d at 822 (emphasis added).
15. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L.
REV. 2045, 2082 (1995) (citing United States v. Brown, 605 F.2d 389,396 (8th Cir.).
16. Trammel at 44 (1980).
17. Id. (citing Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 373 (1933).
18. Trammel at 44 (1980); See Funk, 290 U.S. at 373.
19. Brock at 820 (citing Trammel at 51; Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333
(1951).
20. State v. Serrano, 210 P.3d 892, 897 (Or. 2009).

108

J. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY LAW [VOL. XXXII

ing a legal separation or divorce.21 The purpose of the Privilege is to foster marital relationships by encouraging confidential communication
between spouses.22 The court in Wolfle v. United States famously stated
that, “[t]he basis of the immunity given to communications between
husband and wife is the protection of marital confidences, regarded as
so essential to the preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the administration of justice which the privilege entails.”23
Consequently, there is a presumption that all marital communications are confidential. 24 However, if a communication between husband
and wife is made under circumstances clearly not intended to be confidential, it is not privileged.25 An example of a non-confidential communication is a communication made in the presence of third parties,26
which illustrates the Third Party Presence Rule. 27 Furthermore, a typical trend in state statutes that recognize the privilege is disallowing the
extension to crimes or civil action(s) by one spouse against the other, 28
crimes against a child(ren) of either or both spouse, 29 or to a third party
21. See State v. Christian, 841 A.2d 1158,1172 (Conn. 2004).
22. Id. (citing Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 276 (Wyo. 1994)).
23. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934).
24. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951) (citing Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 14).
25. Wolfle at 14.
26. Id.; State v. Rollins, 675 S.E.2d 334, 336 (N.C. 2009).
27. The Third Party Presence Rule is defined as any otherwise valid privileged
“marital confidence” that has subsequently been “knowingly and voluntarily disclose[d]”
by one of the participants to a third party. State v. Wilkinson, 612 A. 2d 926, 931 (1992).
28. Ala. R. Evid. 504(d); Alaska R. Evid. 505(b)(2); A.R.S. § 12-2232 (A)(1) (2010);
Ark. R. Evid. 504(d); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-90-107(1)(a)(1)(West 2014); Del. R. Evid.
504(d); D.C. Code Ann. § 14-306; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.504 (3) (West 2014); Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 626-1 (c)(West); Idaho Code Ann. § 9-203(1) (West); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-428 (b)(West
2014); Ky. R. Evid. 504(c); La. Code Evid. Ann. art. 504(c); Me. R. Evid. 504(d); MCLS §
600.2162; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02 (West); Miss. R. Evid. 504(d); Mo. Ann. Stat. §
546.260 (West); Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-802; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-505; Nev. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 49.295 (West); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-22 (West); N.D. R. Evid. 504(d); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2945.42 (West); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2504 (d)(West); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 40.255 (West)(a)(c); S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-30; Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-201; Tex. Evid.
R. 504(a)(4); Utah R. Evid. Rule 502(e); Vt. R. Evid. 504(d); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
5.60.060 (West); Wis. Stat. § 905.05(3).
29. Ala. R. Evid. 504(d); Alaska R. Evid. 505(b)(2); Ark. R. Evid. 504(d); Del. R.
Evid. 504(d); D.C. Code Ann. § 14-306; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.504 (3) (West 2014); Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 626-1(c)(West); Idaho Code Ann. § 9-203(1) (West); 735 ILCS 5/8-801(West 2014);
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-428 (b)(West 2014); Ky. R. Evid. 504(c)-(d); La. Code Evid. Ann. art.
504(c); Me. R. Evid. 504(d); Mass. Gen.Laws Ann. Ch. 233, § 20 (West); MCLS § 600.2162;
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02 (West); Miss. R. Evid. 504(d); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 546.260 (West);
Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-802; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-505; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49.295
(West); N.H. R. Evid. 504; N.D. R. Evid. 504(d); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.42 (West);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2504 (d)(West); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40.255(a)(West); S.C. Code
Ann. § 19-11-30; Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-1-201; Tex. Evid. R. 504(a)(4); Utah R. Evid. Rule
502(e); Vt. R. Evid. 504(d); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 5.60.060 (West); Wis. Stat. § 905.05(3).
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injured in the commission of a crime against spouse or child. 30 Overall,
the Privilege is recognized federally, 31 and is codified in 49 states, 32 33
the District of Columbia,34 and various U.S. Territories.35
THE EVOLUTION OF MARRIAGE: ABRIDGED
The institution of marriage has drastically evolved. At one point,
women were viewed as their husband’s property, and it was not until
recently that same-sex marriage was recognized.36 In the early eighteenth century, marriage was considered a legalized form of prostitution
due to the limitations placed on women before it was denounced. 37 William Blackstone, a legal expert, described eighteenth century marriage
as the suspension of a woman’s legal existence.38 Blackstone further analyzed a woman’s being during marriage as one that was consolidated
into that of the husband’s, “‘under whose wing[s], protection or cover
30. Ala. R. Evid. 504(d); Ark. R. Evid. 504(d); Del. R. Evid. 504(d); Haw. Rev. Stat. §
626-1(c)(West); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-428 (b)(West 2014); Ky. R. Evid. 504(c); Me. R. Evid.
504(d); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-505; N.D. R. Evid. 504(d); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2504
(d)(West); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40.255 (a)(West); Utah R. Evid. Rule 502(e); Vt. R. Evid.
504(d).
31. See Fed. R. Evid. 501; SEC v. Lavin, 111. F.3d 921, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (recognizing the existence of both marital privileges).
32.
Ala. R. Evid. 504(b); Alaska R. Evid. 505(b); A.R.S. § 12-2232 (2010); Ark. R.
Evid. 504(b); Cal. Evid. Code § 917 (West 2014); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-90107(1)(a)(1)(West 2014); Del. R. Evid. 504; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.504 (West 2014); O.C.G.A
§ 24-5-501; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 626-1 (West); Idaho Code Ann. § 9-203(1) (West); 735 ILCS
5/8-801(West 2014); Ind. R. Evid. 501; Iowa Code Ann. § 622.9 (West); Kan. Stat. Ann. §
60-428 (West 2014); Ky. R. Evid. 504;La. Code Evid. Ann. art. 504; Me. R. Evid. 504; Md.
Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-105 (West); Mass. Gen.Laws Ann. Ch. 233, § 20 (West);
MCLS § 600.2162; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02 (West); Miss. R. Evid. 504; Mo. Ann. Stat. §
546.260 (West); Mont. Code Ann. § 26-1-802; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-505; Nev. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 49.295 (West); N.H. R. Evid. 504; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-22 (West); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 38-6-6 (West); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4502 (McKinney); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 8-57 (West);
N.D. R. Evid. 504; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.42 (West); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2504
(West); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40.255 (West); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5914 (West); R.I.
Gen. Laws § 9-17-13; S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-30; S.D. Codified Laws § 19-13-13; Tenn.
Code Ann. § 24-1-201; Tex. Evid. R. 504; Utah R. Evid. Rule 502; Vt. R. Evid. 504; Va.
Code Ann. § 19.2-271.2; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 5.60.060 (West); W. Va. Code § 57-3-4;
Wis. Stat. § 905.05 (2012); Wyo. Stat. § 1-12-104.
33. Connecticut has not codified the marital communications privilege, but courts
recognize the privilege. State v. Christian, 841 A.2d 1158, 1173 (Conn. 2004).
34. D.C. Code Ann. § 14-306.
35. 6 G.C.A. § 3102.
36. See A Historical Look at Marriage, supra note 1.
37. Karen Offen, A Brief History of Marriage: Marriage Laws and Women’s Financial Independence, Economica: Women and the Global Economy, INTERNATIONAL MUSEUM
OF
WOMEN,
http://exhibitions.globalfundforwomen.org/economica/marriage-andmoney/brief-history-marriage (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
38. Id.
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she perform[ed] everything.’”39 During that time, women were not allowed to own property and all of their finances were subject to the control of their husbands.40 By the nineteenth century, women gained independent rights, separate from their husbands, due to the passage of the
Married Women’s Property Acts.41
Incidentally, women were not the only group of citizens that have
been banned or restricted in marriage.42 For many years, interracial
marriage was not permitted.43 In 1948, California became the first state
to challenge racial discrimination in marriage by declaring the ban on
interracial marriage unconstitutional. 44 It took almost 20 years for the
United States Supreme Court to follow California’s courageous lead on
such a controversial issue; in 1967, the Court declared all antiinterracial marriage statutes unconstitutional. 45
Currently in the 21st century, the Supreme Court has considered
the institution of marriage in relation to same-sex couples. 46 The Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the Defense Of Marriage
Act (“DOMA”), 47 a federal law that allows states to determine whether
or not they will recognize same-sex marriages created in other jurisdictions.48 One of the major issues was with regard to section 3 of DOMA,
which defined “marriage” as “ a legal union between one man and one
woman” and “spouse” as “a person of the opposite sex who is a husband
or a wife.”49 The Supreme Court ruled that section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional.50 Most recently, in June 2015, two years after the decision in United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution guaranteed the right to same-sex marriage.51 Obergefell v.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.; see generally Married Women’s Property Acts, Encyclopaedia Britannica,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/366305/Married-Womens-Property-Acts (last
visited May 1, 2014)(defining the Married Women Property Acts as a series of statutes
that expanded the rights of married women. Starting in 1839, these acts gave married
women the ability to act as independent agents in legal situations.)
42. See A Historical Look at Marriage, supra note 1.
43. Id.
44. Id.; Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 29 (Cal. 1948).
45. A Historical Look at Marriage, supra note 1; see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967).
46. A Historical Look at Marriage, supra note 1.
47. See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
48. Christopher Gacek, Basic Facts About The Defense of Marriage Act, FAMILY
RESEARCH
COUNCIL,
http://www.frc.org/onepagers/basic-facts-about-the-defense-ofmarriage-act (last visited Apr. 2, 2014).
49. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
50. Id. at 2696; Frequently Asked Questions: Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),
GLAAD, http://www.glaad.org/marriage/doma (last visited Apr. 2, 2014).
51. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Makes Same-Sex Marriage a Right Nationwide,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/supreme-court-same-sex-
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Hodges52 is a case in which a same sex couple, after the United States v.
Windsor ruling, married in the State of Maryland. 53 The couple moved
to Ohio and, after learning that Ohio did not recognize their marriage,
filed suit against the State alleging that it was discriminating against
same-sex couples that were lawfully married. 54 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that all states are required to grant
same-sex marriages and to recognize same-sex marriages previously
granted in other states.55
MARITAL PRIVACY: A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Fundamental rights are rights recognized by the Supreme Court to
deserve high levels of protection from government encroachment. 56 Although the right to privacy is not one that is explicit in the Constitution,
it is one that courts have recognized as a fundamental right. 57 The Supreme Court has also declared marriage as a fundamental right because of how essential it is to the “orderly pursuit of happiness by free
man.”58
Essentially, marriage is a central aspect of the right to privacy 59
and many privacy cases revolve specifically around the institution of
marriage. Beginning in 1888, in Maynard v. Hill, the Supreme Court
established how important and fundamental the institution of marriage
is.60 The Court explained that, “[m]arriage […] create[s] the most important relation in life [and has] more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution[.]” 61
Later in 1942, the Court in Skinner v. State of Okl. ex rel. Williamson further emphasized the importance of marriage as a fundamental
right.62 Skinner, involved an Act that allowed the State to sterilize repeat sex offenders.63 The Court expressed the fundamental importance
of marriage by stating that marriage is “one of the basic civil rights of
marriage.html?_r=0 ( last visited September 3, 2015).
52. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015)
53. Id. at 2594.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2588.
56. Fundamental
Right,
LEGAL
INFORMATION
INSTITUTE,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fundamental_right.
57. 14 Supreme Court Cases: Marriage is a Fundamental Right, Marriage News
Blog, AMERICAN FOUNDATION FOR EQUAL RIGHTS, (November 28, 2012),
http://afer.org/blog/video-14-supreme-court-rulings-on-marriage/.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See generally Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
61. Id. at 205.
62. See generally Skinner v. State of Okl. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
63. Id. at 539.
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man.”64
Twenty years later in Griswold v. Connecticut, a landmark case,
the Court further declared that the right to marry was a fundamental
right.65 The Court stated:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a
way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.66

More recently, the Court reiterated the fundamental right to marriage and marital privacy in relation to same-sex couples.67 In Lawrence v. Texas, a case involving sexual intercourse between two men,68
the Court stated that, “our laws and traditions afford constitutional
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage [...] Persons in a
homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for th[is] purpose, just as
heterosexual persons do.”69 Overall, marriage has a high value in our
society and is regarded as an important right, belonging to all that want
to partake in it.
THE BRIEF HISTORY OF SOCIAL MEDIA
Social media has become a place where people communicate and
interact freely, sharing the most intimate details of their lives while engaging in personal conversations. 70 Starting in 1978 with the creation of
the bulletin board system (BBS),71 social media has evolved into many
different forms including blogs, forums, message boards and social net64. Id. at 541.
65. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
66. Id. at 486.
67. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 574.
70. Curtis, supra note 10.
71. See
Margaret
Rouse,
Bulletin
Board
System,
WHATIS.COM,
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/bulletin-board-system-BBS (last updated September 2005) (stating that an electronic Bulletin Board System (“BBS”) “is a computer or an
application dedicated to the sharing or exchange of messages or other files on a network.
Originally an electronic version of the type of bulletin board found on the wall in many
kitchens and work places, the BBS was used to post simple messages between users.”; see
also Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 980 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (citing
MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F.Supp. 202, 204 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y.1994))(mentioning that
“‘[c]omputer bulletin boards generally offer both private electronic mail service and newsgroups. The latter is essentially email directed to the community at large, rather than a
private recipient.’”
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works.72 In 1985, the America Online service was founded.73 “You’ve Got
Mail!” is a sound that resonates with countless Americans, as AOL became one of the first to bring social online culture and romance into the
home.74 Thereafter, in the early 90’s, the World Wide Web became publically accessible, granting millions of people the opportunity to unlimited and unfiltered online experiences.75 The inception of the World
Wide Web created an explosion of popular Internet forums where people
were able to express themselves openly and freely about current issues.76
By the late 90’s, modern social networking came into existence,
with SixDegrees being the first social networking website. 77 SixDegrees
was an interactive web application which allowed people to make profiles and connect with friends by becoming friends with other users and
creating a friends list.78 As time went on, interactive web applications
became very popular and spurred up the creation of Friendster,
Myspace, Facebook and Twitter in the early to mid 2000’s. 79 Within the
last five years, social media has become an essential element of daily
life.80 As of 2013, Facebook reported a whopping 1.11 billion users; 81
Twitter reported 500 million registered users 82 and MySpace reported a
total of 25 million users.83
Before determining whether social media communications are afforded protection under the marital privilege, we must first look at
whether social media communications are provided protections elsewhere. Contrary to popular belief, social media communications are
provided some level of protection.
PRIVACY POLICIES ON SOCIAL MEDIA SITES
When signing up to participate in a social media network, you consent to a set of terms and conditions. The terms and conditions include
a data use or privacy policy that explains how the website receives information about you, how the information is categorized and used, and
72. Curtis, supra note 10.
73. Id.
74. See Borders, supra note 9 (discussing the appearance of AOL through the movie,
“You’ve Got Mail!”).
75. Curtis, supra note 10; see Borders, supra note 9 (discussing the creation of the
World Wide Web in the 1960’s).
76. Borders, supra note 9
77. Id.
78. Curtis, supra note 10; Borders, supra note 9
79. Curtis, supra note 10.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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essentially what information is not private.84 For example, the privacy
policies of Facebook, MySpace and Twitter all state that the information they collect from the user, which includes registration information and the information shared on the network (e.g. pictures,
tweets, or status updates), is to better improve the services provided to
you over time. 85 Moreover, the policies all state that the sites may use
users’ information in response to legal requests if they have a reasonable belief that compliance with the law is required.86
The social media sites also provide descriptions of what public information means in their policies.87 Facebook, for example, states that
your name, profile picture, cover photos, networks, gender, username
and ID are always publically available and treated as information you
decide to make public.88 Additionally, if a user decides to delete their social media account, the process is not simple. On Facebook, aside from
the fact that the link to delete your account is hidden within the pages
of the privacy policy, the actual deletion of an account takes approximately one month.89 Even after deletion, “some information may remain
in backup copies and logs for up to 90 days.” 90
Interestingly enough, all of the privacy policies analyzed and compared in this article barely mention private messaging. 91 The policies
only mention private messaging in the recognition of its existence. 92 It
84. Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info
(last revised November 15, 2013); Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER, INC.,
https://twitter.com/privacy (last revised October 21, 2013); Privacy Policy, MYSPACE,
https://myspace.com/pages/privacy (last revised May 14, 2014).
85. Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK; Twitter Privacy Policy; Privacy Policy, MYSPACE.
86. Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK; Twitter Privacy Policy; Privacy Policy, MYSPACE.
87. Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info
(last revised November 15, 2013); see Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER, INC. (stating that
“non private information” includes: public user profile information, public Tweets, the
people you follow or that follow you, or the number of users who clicked on a particular
link); see Privacy Policy, MYSPACE (stating that public information includes: full name,
username, profile URL, About Me, Profile photo, profile cover, stated location, gender, age
and MySpace ID).
88. Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. (only stating that it receives data about the user when he or she sends
and receives a message; it states nothing further about private messages); see Twitter
Privacy Policy, TWITTER (not mentioning private messages/direct messages in the privacy
policy; not listing private/direct messages in the information that the site considers public); see Privacy Policy, MYSPACE (barely mentioning private messaging in the privacy policy; does not mention private messages in the list of what is public information). The
MySpace policy does state that private messages cannot be deleted and only moved to the
archives.
MySpace
Messages,
MYSPACE,
https://www.askmyspace.com/t5/Articles/Myspace-Messages/ba-p/38821 (last revised May
14, 2014).
92. See Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK; Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER; Privacy Poli-
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is important to note that the privacy policies do not categorize private
messages as “public information,” which implies that there is some level
of privacy protection afforded to private messages.
THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
Another level of protection for social media private messaging is the
Stored Communications Act (“SCA”).93 The SCA was passed under the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act in 1986. 94 The SCA prevents
communication service providers from disclosing private communications to particular entities and individuals. 95 Many believe that Congress enacted this statute because of the lack of protection provided by
the Fourth Amendment.96 The Act gives greater privacy protections
than the Fourth Amendment while merely requiring a subpoena to obtain information shared on social media sites. 97
Within the statute, Congress distinguishes between two types of
communications: Electronic Communication Services (“ECS”) and Remote Communication Services (“RCS”). 98 Each type of communication
receives different regulations.
An ECS provider is defined as “any service, which provides to users
[…] the ability to send or receive […] electronic communications.” 99 Additionally, an ECS provider is prohibited from disclosing only “the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service.” 100
The Act defines electronic storage as: “(A) any temporary, intermediate
storage of a[n] […] electronic communication incidental to the electronic
transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an
electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of
such communication[.]”101 The statute defines a RCS as “the provision to
the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an
electronic communications system[.]”102 A RCS provider:
cy, MYSPACE.
93.
94.

18 U.S.C. §§ 2701- 2712
See Crispin, 717 F. Supp. at 971 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Mikah K. Story, Twenty-First

Century Pillow-Talk: Applicability of the Marital Communications Privilege to Electronic
Mail, 58 S.C. L. REV. 275, 286 (2006).
95. Crispin at 971 (citing Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1213
(2004).
96. Crispin at 972; Mikah, supra note 94 at 287.
97. Crispin at 972.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 271(2) (2012); Crispin at 972; Mikah,
supra note 94 at 286- 287.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (15).
100. Crispin at 972 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2702).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 2711.
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may not divulge the content of any communication received by electronic transmission that is carried or maintained on its service for a
customer or subscriber ‘solely for the purpose of providing storage or
computer processing services to [the] subscriber or customer, if the
provider is not authorized to access the contents of [the] communications for purposes of providing . . . services other than storage or computer processing.’103

Overall, the level of protection social media sites provide to users
depends on whether the sites would be considered an ECS or a RCS.
Although there are few cases that answer this question, one court has
determined that social media sites can be considered both ECS and
RCS.104 In Crispin, the California District Court made this ruling by
comparing social media sites containing both private and public components to emails and electronic bulletin board systems (“BBS”). 105
Through this comparison, the Court determined that unopened, private
messages on social media sites operate under an ECS provider because
the messages are in electronic storage and fall within the temporary,
intermediate storage category.106 Under the SCA, this means that the
government may access a communication for 180 days or less pursuant
to a warrant.107 As for the messages that have been opened, social media
sites operate as RCS providers by providing a storage system.108 This
allows the government to access it for longer than 180 days. 109
In sum, private messages made through social media networking
sites are afforded some protection under the SCA. However, because the
barriers of that protection are unclear, the marital privilege may be the
only way to secure private communications made through social media.
ANALYSIS
A COMPARISON OF THE MARITAL PRIVILEGE TO OTHER EVIDENTIARY
PRIVILEGES
In order to fully grasp the necessity and functionality behind the
use of the marital privilege, it is beneficial to compare the privilege to
other evidentiary privileges. Other evidentiary privileges include the
attorney-client privilege, the patient-physician privilege, and the psy-

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Crispin at 973.
Id. at 985-91.
Id. at 980-81.
Id. at 987.
Mikah, supra note 94 at 287.
Crispin at 987.
Mikah, supra note 94 at 287 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)).
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chotherapist-patient.110
The attorney-client privilege serves the purpose of promoting open
and full communications between the attorney and client.111 This privilege ensures that statements made by any person who seeks legal advice or aid from a lawyer in confidence will be completely protected. 112
The patient-physician privilege protects the confidential communications made by a patient to their physician regarding care and medical
treatment.113 The privilege is necessary for the free flow of information
between the patient and physician to promote the administration of
proper care.114 Lastly, the psychotherapist-patient privilege protects
confidential communications between the patient and psychologist, social worker, or licensed counselor from disclosure, when such communications assist the professional in making a complete diagnosis. 115 The
purpose of this privilege is to assure a patient that the most intimate
and embarrassing details of their lives are held in confidence.116 Such
assurance is vital to ensure that the patient fully discloses facts that aid
in diagnosis and treatment.117
The commonalities between these privileges are evident. First, in
order for a court to recognize any evidentiary privilege, four circumstances must be present: “1) The communications must originate in a
confidence that they will not be disclosed; 2) [The] element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relation between the parties; 3) The relation must be one which in the
opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered; [and] 4) The
injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation.”118 Secondly, scholars believe that the purposes of
evidentiary privileges is to help individuals “‘effectively exercise autonomy by facilitating intelligent, independent life preference choices.’”119
Such autonomy is promoted by allowing individuals to freely consult
110. Id. at 294.
111. Id.
112. What the Attorney-Client Privilege Really Means, Smith, Gambrell and Russell
LLP, http://www.sgrlaw.com/resources/trust_the_leaders/leaders_issues/ttl5/916/, (last
visited Apr. 30, 2014).
113. Confidentiality, Patient/Physician, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS,
http://www.aafp.org/about/policies/all/patient-confidentiality.html (last visited Apr. 30,
2014).
114. Id.
115. Mikah, supra note 94 at 298 (citing Cal. Evid. Code § 1012 (West 2006); Iowa
Code Ann. § 622.10 (West 1999); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 32 §§ 7005; Minn. Stat. Ann. §
595.02(g) (West 2000); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 18.83.110 (West 2006)).
116. Mikah, supra note 94 at 298.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 305 (citing 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2285, at 57).
119. Mikah, supra note 94 at 310.
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confidants, thus prompting free flowing communications. 120
Each privilege serves to protect communications between individuals in relationships valued by society. Case law is lacking on the application of the other privileges to electronic communications (i.e. text
messages and social media communications). However, each privilege
centers on the free flow of confidential communications and is “rooted in
the imperative need for confidence and trust.” 121 That being said, it is
clear that the marital communications privilege is of utmost importance. Being one of the oldest institutions of civilization, the martial
relationship depends on open and honest communications. Without an
open and free flowing environment, the marital relationship cannot
survive.
APPLICABILITY OF THE MARITAL PRIVILEGE TO ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS
Case law analyzing the marital privilege’s application to social media communications is virtually non-existent. Therefore, it is important
to look at how the marital privilege applies to electronic communications generally. This article looks at two types of electronic communications: emails and text-messages. Once analyzed, this article determines
the protections that social media communications are afforded under
the Privilege.
EMAIL
When determining the protections social media communications
are afforded, the closest form of communication to private messages
sent on social media is email because each involves sending and receiving messages. Accordingly, courts have started to analogize the two
when considering the protections given to social media communications.
Although case law is lacking, there is little doubt that emails between
spouses fall under the marital privilege. 122 There are isolated instances
where, if not for one factor, the privilege would have attached. 123 However, courts recognize that the right is fundamentally present, only
when the proper circumstances are present. 124
For example, in Reaves v. State,125 the defendant wife, Charlott
Reaves, was charged with malicious murder of her minor stepdaugh-

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Trammel at 51.
See generally Reaves; See generally Hamilton; See generally Etkin.
See generally Reaves; See generally Hamilton; See generally Etkin.
See generally Reaves; See generally Hamilton; See generally Etkin.
Reaves at 208.
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ter.126 The defendant wrote emails to her husband regarding the murder.127 When the State attempted to enter the email communications
into evidence, the defendant asserted that they were inadmissible under the martial privilege.128 The marital privilege statute in this jurisdiction provided that the Privilege does not apply to communications
regarding crimes against minor children.129 Although the privilege did
not apply in Reaves, the Court still acknowledged that spousal communications are typically inadmissible.130
Courts have ruled similarly when dealing with the application of
the marital privilege to emails sent on work computers. 131 This category
of emails brings a different aspect to the analysis because the Third
Party Presence Exception132 to the Privilege must be considered in these
circumstances. For example, in United States v. Hamilton,133 defendant
husband and state legislature, Hamilton, was charged with bribery and
extortion.134 The Court allowed the admission of emails sent between
Defendant and his wife from his work computer. 135 Defendant raised the
marital privilege to bar the emails.136 The Court ruled that Defendant
did not take the steps needed to preserve the privilege.137 Additionally,
the Court found that Defendant was aware that his employer, a third
party, had access to the contents of the computer.138 In doing so, it further reasoned that defendant had knowledge of the policy adopted by
his employer which stated that there was “‘no expectation of privacy in
[his] use of the Computer System’” and that “‘[a]ll information created,
sent[,] received, accessed, or stored in the . . . Computer System is subject to inspection and monitoring at any time.’”139 Although the privilege
did not attach in Hamilton because of Defendant’s knowledge of the
126. Id.
127. Id. at 210.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing Ga. Code Ann. § 24-9-21 (West)).
130. Id. (stating that “communications between spouses are privileged and are generally inadmissible.”).
131. See Hamilton at 652.
132. See Wolfle at 14 (holding that the communication privilege was not applicable
because there was a third party involved, a stenographer); see State v. Rollins, 675 S.E.2d
334 (N.C. 2009) (holding that the marital communication privilege was not applicable because the conversation was in a public area where it could be overheard by third parties).
133. Hamilton at 651.
134. Id. at 652.
135. Id. at 655.
136. Id. at 654.
137. Id. at 655.
138. Id.
139. Jeff Kosseff, Fourth Circuit Limits Marital Communications Privilege for Email,
InsidePrivacy (December 18, 2012), http://www.insideprivacy.com/united-states/fourthcircuit-limits-marital-communications-privilege-for-email/.
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presence of a third party, the Court still acknowledged that marital
communications via email are presumptively confidential. 140
The Court in United States v. Etkin had a similar ruling.141 In
Etkin, a deputy sheriff in Sullivan County was indicted for extortion. 142
During the seizure of his work vehicle, a “printed email exchange between Defendant and his wife” was discovered. 143 The government
sought to use the email exchange at trial but the defendant objected on
the grounds that the emails were protected by the marital privilege. 144
The Court ruled that the emails were not subject to the privilege because they were not confidential. 145 The Court recognized that email
communications between spouses were subject to a presumption of confidentiality.146 However, the Court employed the Third Party Presence
Rule and found that because Defendant was notified each time he
logged into the computer that a third party would “monitor, intercept,
record, read, copy, access and capture information for use or disclosure
without additional prior notice,” the privilege did not attach. 147 Moreover, the court stated that Defendant had notice of the work policy because in order to complete the log in process, he had to click “ok” or
press “enter” every time he logged into his work computer. 148
Although every previously mentioned case involved third parties,
the courts recognized that email communications are not considered
privileged communications but were still protected under the marital
privilege.149 Those cases demonstrate that, in most circumstances, the
Privilege is interpreted narrowly.150 However, the courts’ use of the
Third Party Presence Exception evidences the view that the Privilege’s
application should not be narrowly construed when involving electronic
communications. Typically, the application of the Third Party Presence
Exception is not flexible.151 However, courts have recognized the need
for a third party in transporting messages to email users. 152 Thus, when
applying the Third Party Presence Rule in relation to emails, the courts
have carved out, what can be called, an exception to the exception. 153
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Hamilton at 654.
Etkin, 2008 WL 482281.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *3.
Etkin, 2008 WL 482281 at *3.
Id. at *4.
Reaves at 208; Hamilton at 652; Etkin at *5.
See generally Reaves; see generally Hamilton; see generally Etkin.
Mikah, supra note 94 at 279-80.
See Hamilton at 655.
Id.
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Courts have been known to consider the user’s “reasonably designed”
efforts to protect and preserve the privilege and the user’s reasonable
belief in the privacy of the emails sent to determine if the privilege is
preserved. 154 Overall, the case law regarding the applicability of the
privilege to emails indicates that the privilege would also apply to private messages sent on social media sites.
TEXT-MESSAGING
Text messages and private messages sent through social media are
also comparable. Both forms of communication provide users with an
instantaneous connection to others by sending brief electronic messages. Additionally, messages sent through social media sites can be accessed through text messages. Looking at how courts handle text messages relating to the marital privilege is a direct reflection of how the
courts could protect private messages on social media. Fortunately, cases have recognized the fundamental application of the marital privilege
to text messaging, but similarly to email communications, the privilege
is interpreted quite narrowly.155
For example, in State v. Franklin,156 defendant Shawnttis Franklin
was charged and convicted of attempted murder and aggravated burglary.157 Text messages sent by Defendant to a person in the house at
the time of the stabbing and robbery were admitted into evidence. 158
Some of the text messages sent by the defendant stated the following:
“‘I whupped that b[*]tch and served her to let her know I ain’t the one[.]
I told you what I did and didn’t do [, and] you know me I tell you everything so stay down for her then you know.’”159 Defendant claimed that
the text messages were protected from disclosure by the marital privilege.160 The Court ruled that the privilege did not attach in this case because, contrary to Defendant’s assertion, he never established a common law marriage.161 Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that the
privilege would attach to communications between spouses through text
messages.162
Similarly, another court affirmed the protection provided to text
Id.
See State v. Franklin, 121 P.3d 447, 449 (Kan 2005); see generally Commonwealth v. Hunter, 60 A.3d 156 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
156. See generally Franklin, 121 P.3d 447.
157. Id. at 449.
158. Id. at 451.
159. Id. at 450.
160. Id. at 451
161. Id.
162. See Franklin, 121 P.3d 447, 451 (Kan. 2005) (suggesting that the marital privi154.
155.

lege did not apply in this case because the issue was not preserved on appeal).
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message communications under the Privilege.163 In Commonwealth v.
Hunter,164 defendant wife Hunter was charged with assault, aggravated
assault and endangering the welfare of a child. 165 Hunter’s four-year-old
stepson suffered a severe brain injury while in her care. 166 Defendant
sent her husband text messages regarding the injuries and condition of
the child, which were admitted into evidence. 167 Defendant sought to exclude the admissions of the text messages by claiming that they were
protected under marital privilege.168 While recognizing the general rule
that communications between spouses (including text messages) are
presumed confidential, the Court ruled that the privilege could not be
applied in this case because the texts were regarding an offense against
a child.169
In sum, it appears that an exception to the marital privilege would
be applicable to private messages sent through social media websites
based on the application of the Privilege to text messages. Both means
of communication are conceptually comparable in function. Therefore, it
is logical for various courts to apply the fundamental protections the
Privilege affords text message communications to that of private communications made through social media sites.
CHANGE IS SOON TO COME: LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROGRESSION
Legislatures have begun to recognize the widespread presence of
electronic communications in the daily lives of Americans. 170 Some legislation has been passed to accommodate its popularity. So far, there
have been at least two statutes addressing the protections afforded to
electronic communications.171
First, a New York statute states that, “[n]o communication privileged under this article shall lose its privileged character for the sole
reason that it is communicated by electronic means or because persons
necessary for the delivery or facilitation of such electronic communication may have access to the content of the communication.” 172 The second piece of legislation involves California’s confidential communication
statute that states:
If a privilege is claimed on the ground that the matter sought to be
163 .
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See generally Hunter, 60 A.3d 156.
Id.
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Commonwealth v. Hunter, 60 A.3d 156, 159 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013).
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4548 (McKinney); Cal. Evid. Code § 917(a)(b)(West 2014).
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4548; Cal. Evid. Code § 917(a)(b).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4548.
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disclosed is a communication made in confidence in the course of the
[…] husband-wife […] relationship, the communication is presumed to
have been made in confidence[.] A communication between [spouses]
does not lose its privileged character for the sole reason that it is
communicated by electronic means or because persons involved in the
delivery, facilitation, or storage of electronic communications may
have access to the content of the communication. 173

The case law suggests that the legislature intends to include social
media communications within the meaning of the statute. 174 In California, for example, the United States District Court for the Central District of California was one of the first courts to consider and establish
that private messages sent through social media are protected from ediscovery requests.175
Overall, the statutes and emerging case law provide an insightful
view at the future of the martial communications privilege in relation to
electronic and private social media communications. As the means of
communication are evolving and the majority of communications are
made through online mediums, the marital communications privilege
needs to be extended in order to serve its intended purpose.
THE PROPOSAL TO EXTEND THE MARITAL PRIVILEGE
Due to the expansion of the marital relationship in recent years,
the marital privilege is more important now than ever before. As previously stated, the purpose of the marital privilege is to foster marital relationships by encouraging confidential communications between
spouses.176 The Privilege protects marital confidences because they are
regarded as so essential to the preservation of the marriage relationship
and outweighs the disadvantages to the administration of justice. 177
Clearly, the underlying reason for the privilege is to preserve the
marital relationship.178 To explore the essence in which the marital relationship derives is vital in determining the fate of the Privilege. For
many years, family law scholars have grappled with two categories of
the marital relationships: contractual relationship and status relationship. Although the complexity of the marital relationship cannot be
summarized fully within these two concepts, this section explores each
category and applies the appropriate approaches in order to determine
whether the Privilege should be expanded.

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Cal. Evid. Code § 917(a)(b).
See Crispin at 987.

See generally id.
Trammel at 44.
Wolfle at 14.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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CONTRACTUAL APPROACH
A contract typically means a writing containing terms agreed by
both parties, in addition to promises that the law will enforce.179 Legally, a contract is defined as “a promise or a set of promises for the breach
of which the law gives a remedy.”180 In order to create a fully functioning contract, there needs to be an offer, acceptance and consideration. 181
The consideration is the most essential part of a contract’s formation. It
embodies the actual exchange of the promises, which entails commitments by parties to act in the future.182 Furthermore, contracts incorporate particular relations between people, which incur responsibilities
from the individual participants.183
The law of contracts is relevant to the marital relationship in many
different ways. It is principally believed that individuals who enter into
a marital unity are entering into an agreement in which they decide as
individuals on the type of system they want to incorporate into their relationship.184 Although there are written aspects to the marital relationship, which include prenuptial agreements and marital licenses, 185 the
concept of the contractual approach is centered on the marital relationship’s private will.186 It embodies the concepts of contract law in the expressed and implied will of the parties, what they intend and expect
from the marital relationship. 187 In the article, Spousal Privilege and
the Meaning of Marriage, a concept referred to as the “External Stance”
is useful in further understanding the implications of the marital relationship to contract law.188
As Milton Regan189 implies, the External Stance is the standpoint
that expresses a person’s independent stance on the moral demands
made by the relationship in which they are involved.190 Regan further
states that the contract approach implicates the abstraction of individ-

179. Gaytri Kachroo, Mapping Alimony: From Status to Contract and Beyond, 5
PIERCE L. REV. 163, 212 (2007).
180. E. Allan Farnsworth, 1 Farnsworth On Contracts 4 n.1 (1990).
181. Scott J. Burnham, Contract Law for Dummies, FOR DUMMIES,
http://www.dummies.com/how-to/content/contract-law-for-dummies-cheat-sheet.html (last
visited Apr. 30, 2014).
182. Kachroo, supra note 179 at 213.
183. Id. at 187.
184. Id. at 214.
185. Id. at 213.
186. See Id. at 172 (focusing on the choices of the parties; what they choose and do
not choose in the relationship).
187. Id.
188. Regan, supra note 15 at 2067-79.
189. Id. at 2067.
190. Id.
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uals from social constructs and focuses more on self-interest.191 Through
the external stance approach to marriage, each person in the relationship appreciates and views one another as individuals. Overall, the
contract approach lends itself to the question of whether the benefits
and burdens of family life could be justified by consent of each individual, highlighting the importance of personal choice in marriage.192
STATUS APPROACH
Status is defined as “the position or rank of someone or something
when compared to others in a society, organization or group; the official
position of a person […] according to the law.” 193 Marriage, for example,
is a relationship traditionally treated as a distinct and exclusive legal
status.194 Entering into a marriage automatically secures individuals
with a distinct set of legal rights, obligations, and social recognition. 195
The status approach to marriage centers itself around the importance of community membership. Within the status approach, the
belief is that “good life involves membership in social communities”;
such memberships are of primary importance to human happiness. 196
The status approach is contingent on public recognition from their families, the neighborhood, and/or the state. 197
The status approach suggests that, in order for a marriage to flourish, there must be some relinquishment of one’s “‘[self-]perception of
empathetic identification and unselfish concern” by the individuals in
order to fulfill the meaning of the “‘interpersonal relationship and the
growth of love.’”198 Within this approach is the concept of group identity.199 In order for a group to formulate such an identity, there needs to
be an open flow of communication. 200 For example, group discussions
provide a means to build solidarity amongst members, which in turn increases the willingness to forgo individual advantage for the sake of the
group.201 Overall, the status approach includes a central foundation of
191. Id. at 2069.
192. Regan, supra note 15 at 2073.
193. Status, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2015), http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/status.
194. Jana B. Singer, Legal Regulation of Marriage: From Status to Contract and

Back
Again?,http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1762&conte
xt=fac_pubs. (last visited Apr. 30, 2014).
195. Id. (citing Maynard)
196. Kachroo, supra note 179 at 197.
197. Id.
198. Regan, supra note 15 at 2082.
199. Id. at 2084.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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loyalty and trust in a status relationship (i.e. the marital relationship).
Loyalty and trust are important concepts in a marriage. One who
enters into a marriage takes on the commitment of being selfvulnerable and, in turn, accepts such risk for the sake of the relationship.202 Accepting such risk assumes that the other spouse will be loyal
and trustworthy.203 Loyalty and trust are concepts that are developed
through a shared history.204 The couple acknowledges that individuals
intertwine their fates within one another, for the sake of the relationship in which they both contribute. 205
THE APPROACHES AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE PRIVILEGE
Marriage is a joint endeavor and is incapable of being reduced to
individual costs and benefits.206 The private aspect of marriage has been
recognized for years as being a fundamental right, and although that
private right in nature is one highlighted under the contract approach,
the essential right to be in such a private relationship is what the status approach highlights.207
Many scholars argue in favor of dividing marriage into these two
approaches. Some believe that marriage must either be a status relationship or a contractual relationship, but never both. 208 Based on the
above discussion, the nexus between the two is so evident that dividing
the two approaches is meaningless. The martial relationship consists of
both contract and status elements, which substantiates its importance.209
The contract approach focuses on the private will of the parties,
while the status approach focuses on public recognition. The marital relationship is dependent on both spouses to survive. For example, the
contract approach consists of relations between people who enter into
an agreement, and who ultimately decide on the type of system that
they want to carry out.210 As suggested under the status approach, one
must relinquish one’s self in order to fulfill the true meaning of the
agreement. Additionally, individual choice to enter into a marriage is
Id. at 2106.
Id.
Regan, supra note 15 at 2106.
Id. at 2107.
Id. at 2050.
See generally Maynard; See generally Skinner; See generally Griswold; See
generally Lawrence.
208. See Kachroo, supra note 179 at 172-173 (describing Ellman’s view that the mari202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

tal relationship remains a status relationship).
209. See Regan, supra note 15 at 2050 (establishing that the marriage relationship is
seen as both the external stance (contractual relationship) and internal stance (status relationship)).
210. See Kachroo, supra note 179 at 187.
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supported by implications of the contract approach. Moreover, one must
relinquish themselves while acknowledging that such relinquishment is
beneficial and is accomplished through trust and loyalty.
Further, the evolution of marriage, namely same-sex marriage, is a
prime example of the nexus between both approaches. The movement
behind same-sex marriage involves both status and contractual approaches. There are status implications in the sense that same sex couples want public recognition and respect of their unity.211 The contractual implications include the “private will” to enter into relationships
and to express their self-interests, without interference.
One might wonder how all of this relates to the martial privilege.
The answer to that question is simple. Having been around for centuries,212 it is impossible to imagine the elimination of the marital privilege.213 Conversely, it is conceivable to imagine its expansion in order to
signify its true essence. The marital communications privilege contributes to holding marriages together as it gives widespread recognition
and security. Some may argue that many couples are unaware of the
Privilege’s existence and most likely do not make communication decisions contingent on the Privilege’s protection.214 Although communication is generally a voluntary act, its frequency can be affected by the legal assurance of confidentiality. 215 The legal system has contributed to
the notion that existence has a meaningful order. 216 This legal function
is no different with regard to the marital communications privilege.
An important facet of marriage is choice. Today, as social media
communications are becoming the norm in society,217 married couples
are choosing to incorporate that movement in their relationships by using social media as a form of constant communications. 218 The law
should reflect the social media movement in order for the Privilege to
continue carry out its primary function.
THE SOCIAL MEDIA COMMUNICATION EXCEPTION AS A PROPOSAL FOR THE
EXTENSION
The extension of the marital privilege can come in many forms. It
211. See Shadee Ashtari, Eight Same- Sex Couples in Florida Sue State For Recognition
of
Their
Out-OfState
Marriages,
THE
HUFFINGTON
POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/13/florida-same-sex-marriagelawsuit_n_4957015.html (March 13, 2014 12:59 pm).
212. See Trammel at 43.
213. Regan, supra note 15 at 2063.
214. Mikah, supra note 94 at 280; Regan, supra note 15 at 2062.
215. Regan, supra note 15 at 2061.
216. Id. at 2064.
217. See generally Lenhart & Duggan, supra note 2.
218. Id.

128

J. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY LAW [VOL. XXXII

can mirror statutes such as the ones in California219 or the New York.220
However, I am proposing that the marital communications privilege
should include a social media exception.
The social media exception to the marital communications privilege
can be added to all marital privilege statutes and would function as a
way to negate the Third Party Presence Rule. Instead of asking the
court to create a social media privilege, the exception would be coupled
with the marital communications privilege and operate as a doubleedged sword of protection. The reason it would be called an exception is
because of how the Third Party Presence Rule operates.
The Third Party Presence Rule bars the privilege from attaching if
a party knowingly and voluntarily discloses the communication to a
third party.221 Because social media outlets serve as a medium to send
and deliver messages and may be considered third parties, problems
may arise with applying the privilege. However, with the social media
exception in place, the privilege would attach despite the third party
argument.
The idea, in essence, was partially influenced by Mallory Allen and
Aaron Orhiem’s co-article entitled Get Outta My Face [Book]: The Dis-

coverability of Social Networking Data and Passwords Needed to Access
Them.222 Allen and Orhiem focus on the discoverability of social media

communications and highlight some of the reasons why opponents of
broad social networking discovery believe that social media information
should be protected from the discovery process.223
In the Article, one of their conclusions is that social networking information should be protected by an evidentiary privilege, 224 similar to
that of the attorney/client or marital privileges. 225 The authors entertain the idea of creating a new evidentiary privilege that would be
called the “social media communication privilege” but quickly negate
the idea.226 The conclusion that the social media communication privilege would fail on its own is sensible because the courts do not like creating new privileges.227 However, there appears to be no reason for
219.
220.
221.
222.
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225. Id. at 138.
226. Id. at 140-42.
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courts not to adopt a social media communication “privilege” as an exception to the marital privilege.
There is a test that a litigant must meet in order to establish an evidentiary privilege.228 That four-part test could be used in determining
whether the social media exception should apply when there is question
of the applicability of the martial communications privilege.
Allen and Orhiem suggest that litigants proposing a social media
communication privilege would have problems establishing the test.
Specifically, they suggest that the problems would arise in the following
three areas: 1) that the communication was presumed confidential, 2)
that the relationship between the communicating parties was of some
importance, and 3) that social media relationships are deserving of protection.229
The authors express that the privilege would fail due to the difficulty in establishing that the communication was presumed confidential.230
As an exception to the marital privilege, this would not be a concern as
communications between marital couples are presumed to be confidential.231 As to the concern of establishing that the relationship between
the parties is one of importance, this will not be a problem with the
marital relationship.232 The marital relationship is one of the most important relationships to individuals and society alike.
The last concern of the authors was the proof that social media relationships are deserving of protection. If the social media communication “privilege” is added as an exception to the marital privilege, this
will not be an issue. As this article highlights, social media communications, more specifically private messages sent via social media are currently afforded some protections. 233 Accordingly, due to the growth of its
use in the marital relationship, social media communications are most
deserving of protection in order to preserve the significance of the marital relationship.
An example of a scenario where the social media exception can be
used in is the situation previously explained in the beginning of this article with Mr. Bohon and his wife.234 If they decided to communicate
about the murder via Facebook private messages, courts may rule that
the transcripts of their conversations on Facebook are admissible, despite Mr. Bohon’s attempt to invoke the marital communications privilege. At that point, Mr. Bohon could focus court’s attention the social
media communications exception.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

See supra note 161 and accompanying text
Allen & Orheim, supra note 222 at 141.

Id.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
Allen & Orheim, supra note 222 at 141.
See supra notes 77-101 and accompanying text.
See supra 5-7 and accompanying text.

130

J. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY LAW [VOL. XXXII

Analyzing the four factors, the courts would find that the factors
are satisfied in the Bohon matter and that the exception should apply. 235
For the first factor, the court will see that the communication originated
in a confidence that it would not be disclosed, as the Bohon’s would
have been communicating through private Facebook messaging and not
public wall posts. For the second factor, the court would find that preserving the confidentiality of the Facebook private communication is essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of their marital relationship, as being a married couple, the Bohons have an inherent
expectation of privacy. The courts would find that the third factor is satisfied because marriage is a relationship that is upheld in the community to be sedulously fostered. Finally, the court would find that the
fourth factor is met because the lack of protection for private Facebook
communication would injure the marital relationship because such relationships are based on communication; if married couples cannot trust
that private communications will be kept private, the foundation of a
marriage will crumble.
All in all, adding a social media communication exception to the
marital privilege seems to be the most effective and efficient way to get
the law to progress with society.
CONCLUSION
Marital confidences and communications between husband and
wife are typically not solely exchanged across the pillow anymore. 236 Instead, married couples are taking advantage of social media to communicate due to its convenience. With this present reality, a change in
the marital communications privilege is needed. By gaining further insight into the importance of the privilege, an understanding as to why
the marital relationship depends on the existence and expansion of the
privilege is explained throughout this article.
With my proposal for a social media communications exception, I
am not negating the fact that the Third Party Presence Rule is needed
or denoting its importance to the application of the marital communications privilege. What I intend, however, is to pave a way for the law to
catch up to the trends of society without losing its underlying meaning.
The marital relationship is one deeply rooted in society and the free
flow of communication is central to the existence of that relationship.
The marital communications privilege aids the marital relationship by
codifying the importance of its privacy and recognizing publically that
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
Peter Lawlor, NH Rule of Evidence No. 504 The Martial Privilege in the Age of
Email, Texting and Social Media, 52 N.H.B.J. 12 (2012).
235.
236.
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the relationship deserves such privacy. Overall, my hope through the
analysis of this issue is to bring awareness to the problematic areas in
the law in order to meet the proper execution of the privilege.

